The Problem of Evil, part 1: a problem for theists and non-theists alike
This issue has been coming up a lot lately for me, whether at Sojourn, Skeptics’ Bible Study, the panel discussion at Jubilee, and here in the blogosphere. This is a vexing philosophical and theological issue, and in my opinion, it is the single most difficult question Christians are faced with. Also called “Theodicy,” (by Leibniz), which means “the justification of God,” because it assumes God is on trial for the evil in the world.
Despite many attempts, this issue is not easily solved or resolved. This post is very long, and is merely an attempt to state the nature of the problem, first for the Christian, then for the non-theist.
I. The Problem of Evil for Christians
It’s usually presented as the ultimate problem for Christians, and theists in general. And they’re right. Both Logically, and emotionally, experientially.
First, let’s take the problem Logically. Christians believe in an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God, who despite the real existence o evil, is not the author of it. This presents a logical problem. We get an ancient formulation of problem, by Epicurus, via David Hume:
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?
Next, let’s take the problem Emotionally & Experientially. Because evil is NOT abstract–it is personal. It is felt. It is lived.
In “God’s Problem,” Bart Ehrman puts his cards on the table. Here’s a guy who makes his living debunking the Bible, but in “God’s Problem,” he reveals that THIS is why he doesn’t believe. In the introduction, he gives his Christian credentials, and then admits “the problems of the Bible are not what led me to leave the faith…I realized that I could no longer reconcile the claims of faith with the facts of life. In particular, I could no longer explain how there can be a good and all-powerful God actively involved with this world, given the state of things” p.3. For this renowned scholar, his breaking up with God was a very emotional parting, and he describes how he left “kicking and screaming” (a clear reference to C.S. Lewis’ conversion TO Christianity).
These questions not unknown to God followers! Habakkuk deals with this as well:
2 How long, O LORD, must I call for help,
but you do not listen?
Or cry out to you, “Violence!”
but you do not save?
3 Why do you make me look at injustice?
Why do you tolerate wrong?
Destruction and violence are before me;
there is strife, and conflict abounds.
4 Therefore the law is paralyzed,
and justice never prevails.
The wicked hem in the righteous,
so that justice is perverted.
These are serious problems and objections. It doesn’t seem to make sense, and it feels implausible and unbelievable. But we Christians are not the only ones with problems! We’ll deal next with the severe problem that evil presents for non-theists.
II. The Problem of Evil for non-theists
Everyone who has ever lived has to make sense of good and evil, somehow.
I believe evil is actually a greater problem for the non-theist. (And I’m not alone).
We can discuss this as 4 different problems: Logically, Epistemologically, ethically/morally, & experientially/emotionally.
1. Logically:
Here’s the implicit logic, usually unstated, at work in the minds of those who view evil as a serious objection to God:
If God exists, everything he should make sense to me.
Evil doesn’t make sense to me.
Therefore God does not exist.
On what basis can one say this? Isn’t this blind faith?
We should see huge problems with that logic!
NT Wright says this is like an average person gazing at the vastness of space through a telescope: Certain stars and planets would be intelligible. But should she then doubt the existence of black holes and supernovas because she doesn’t see them? What would we think of the person who spends a few minutes at a telescope, doesn’t see Mars because she’s looking in the wrong direction, and confidently declares “I didn’t see it, so it must not be there!”
If the eternal, omnipotent God exists, then would we be able to understand all his ways? Would our soda-can size brains be able to comprehend everything about him? If he’s the Creator and we are the creation, then by definition we will not be able to comprehend all of him. So the assumption that if something in the universe doesn’t make sense to me, therefore God doesn’t exist, is inherently fallacious.
2. Epistemologically:
How does the secular non-theist know what “Good” and “Evil” is?
C.S. Lewis in Mere Christianity: “ My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I got this idea of just and unjust? A man does not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line. What was I comparing this universe with when I called it unjust?… Of course I could have given up my idea of justice by saying it was nothing but a private idea of my own. But if I did that, then my argument against God collapsed too–for the argument depended on saying the world was really unjust, not simply that it did not happen to please my fancies…Consequently atheism turns out to be too simple.”
You only question how God could allow evil because you think you have a clear shot of what truly IS good and evil APART from God. But HOW have you got that idea of good and evil? Are you sure this world is unjust/evil? If so, you’re assuming the reality of an external, “extra-natural” standard.
My secular/atheistic friends claim to believe in absolute truths, but its precisely at this point they become functional relativists. You believe in absolute truth, but where is it grounded when comes to morality, to love, to beauty, to other intangible things? Surely not science. By necessity, we hear talk of social contract theory, or even personal opinion.
How do you know your moral standards, by which you’re judging God, are any more than social conventions or personal opinions? If that’s all they are, then you’re in no position to make ANY moral judgments, much less put God on trial, for breaking your relative standards. If I’m just a sophisticated animal, who just got here by chance, then moral categories are absurd. How can there be true rights or wrongs?
If it’s just personal preference, societal/cultural norms, or result of evolutionary/biological hardwiring, as I’ve heard many people admit, then you’ve only created more problems for yourself:
3. Ethically/Morally:
It’s common to criticize Christians for believing in a God who willed for the Amalekites to be put to death, but why do non-theists believe killing the Amalekites is wrong?
It’s common today–downright trendy, in fact–for people to be activists, to be greatly in support of human rights and social justice. Whether it’s the climate, sex slavery, sweatshops, poverty, or education, people are assured of the injustices in the world, and the justness of their cause against these injustices. But WHY?
Alvin Plantinga: “Could there really be any such thing as horrifying wickedness [if there were no God and we just evolved]? I don’t see how. There can be such a thing only if there is a way that rational creatures are supposed to live, obliged to live…a [secular] way of looking at the world has no place for genuine moral obligation of any sort…and thus no way to say there is such a thing as genuine and appalling wickedness. Accordingly, if you think there really is such a thing as horrifying wickeness (…and not just an illusion of some sort), then you have a powerful…argument [for the reality of God]. [“A Christian Life Partly Lived,” Philosophers Who Believe, ed. Kelly James Clark, p. 73, and quoted in Tim Keller’s Reason for God, p. 26-27]
Can you say anything is REALLY, intrinsically, truly evil? How can you call the Holocaust evil? “Ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia, Rwanda, and elsewhere? In those cases, apart from God, why call something wrong? Personally, that was the perpetrators’ preference. Culturally, it fit in with their beliefs and norms. As animals, it was merely the survival of the fittest (because if we’re just sophisticated animals, then the ability to demonize opponents, organize forces, and use weapons is how we make our “clan” survive). On what basis can you tell Hitler’s Germany, or Hutus and Tsutsis that what they are doing is wrong? You can’t DEFINE evil: you’re left incapable of calling something truly evil or wrong.
Dostoyevsky, in Brothers Karamazov, had his Ivan state, “If God is not, everything is permitted.” While this quote is sometimes abused to argue that all atheists are grossly immoral (they’re not), it is nevertheless true that in a God-less universe, we are left without a coherent and absolute moral framework.
This is not only hazardous to humanity and our physical well-being. It’s also dangerous to our psyches, as we see in our 4th category.
4. Experientially/Emotionally
When we see images of Haiti, or hear of murders and rapes on the news, we automatically respond with a “This is wrong–and we must do something about it!” But where does the “ought” come from? Why are we moved, outraged, by suffering, oppression, injustice? Deny your feelings, and you’re less than human or at best a cold-hearted bastard. But in a God-less universe, why listen if they are just the result of evolutionary developments, that they are but the way your neurons were conditioned to fire, and have no real meaning? Wouldn’t intellectual honesty mean admitting all this compassion and concern is arbitrary? Why can’t you rationally overcome this instinct, since these suffering people are (generally) not of your “clan” and not of your concern?
Here, I am not even trying to prove to you good and evil, but demonstrate that you already believe it exists–because in the face of evil, you don’t act as if it’s an arbitrary decision on your part, or the random firing of your neurons due to evolutionary processes, or simply the result of the culture you happen to be located in. No, in the face of evil and suffering, you act as if it is absolute. You still BEHAVE as if certain things are inherently good and bad.
Now let’s get down to brass tacks: What do you tell people on their deathbeds? The woman who just lost a baby? The man just diagnosed with terminal cancer? The lone survivor of a family buried under Haitian rubble? I dare you to give them “there is no after-life, there is no hope, there is no meaning–just make your own out of this.” Only the coldest heart would actually say that, because you know it’s cruel and inhumane. And in these moments of truth, you act as if your beliefs aren’t really true. This is, at least, a clue that they are not.
For these reasons, the problem of evil is a greater challenge for the non-theist, because it reveals the extent to which they borrow the absoluteness of their moral framework from theists (Christians in particular). Any moral authority they have is borrowed.
This is only a statement of the problems for theist and non-theist alike. When I get a chance, I’ll post on the answers/solutions to the problems, where I believe Christianity really begins to separate itself from the pack.
Can I repost this on The Thomas Society?
Steve,
The problem of evil will vary depending on the type of theist. Islam presents a different picture of a merciful God than Christianity does. Polytheists have to overcome other barriers- at some level the divine is the author of evil.
I look forward to reading your apology.
To be brief, and unsatisfactory- Christian Scripture says God is sovereign and not the author of evil. This is a deep mystery to humanity. What is of great comfort to us though is that God opted to do something about evil- kill it and punish it. God is a just God (i.e. Romans). Injustice and evil got their comeuppance on the cross. We need to see the full realization of that, which leads into the existential problem.
There is no doubt it is an existential question. My own life is plagued by the beast of death- friends die in car accidents, collapse dead on a soccer field, and old age. I want to ask God, “why?” I might not get an exhaustive answer, but the answer (“plans for good and for hope”) I get settles the issue.
Robbie–you’re right, it does depend. In case its not clear, I mean “Christian theist” here when I state “theist.”
My main agenda in this post was to deal with what I believe is a big blindspot in secular thought, that the problem of evil is just as much a problem for them, if not more.
I’ll make a more extensive response later, however I’d like to focus right now on re-posted points added to The Thomas Society’s blog:
I think science absolutely has a say in some intangible topics, particularly morality. Thinking of moral memes in terms of evolution makes very intelligible sense of how the majority of societies in existence today view morality. A society that were to view rape, murder, or theft as “good” things is unstable, and is likely to collapse under its own weight with the multitudes raping, murdering, and pillaging. Likewise, a society which views rape, murder, and theft as generally “evil” things and which views individuals who engage in such activities as delinquents is far more stable and will propagate its civilization further.
I think this idea applies to natural evils as much as it does to man-made evils: A society which views earthquakes, tsunamis, tornadoes and the like as “evil” will do their best to prevent such events and to alleviate the suffering caused from such events.
I disagree. The coldest heart would provide these individuals false hope.
Do terrible things happen? Yes. Is there an after-life? (Let’s assume for the sake of argument) No. Does this mean there is no hope? Does this mean there is no meaning? I staunchly disagree. Does this mean that we must derive our own hope and meaning? Perhaps, but what is inherently wrong with that? How would not having an eternity to live for make this life less important?
However, I would like to answer your questions seriously: What do I tell people on their deathbeds? Why would I tell them anything other than how I feel about them, how thankful I am to have learned things from them in their lifetime, and how much their influence on me will live on through my life? Better yet, why would I say anything? I would much rather hear anything this dying individual has to say to me as this is the last chance I’ll get to hear them speak.
For the remaining questions: I don’t feel a need to proselytize my beliefs to anyone, much less a grieving individual. You want to know why? Because the potential reality of the situation that there is absolutely nothing we can do about it and that there is absolutely no true justice in the world IS a very tough pill to swallow, especially in times of grief! I’m no sadist.
What an amazing load of dingo’s kidneys.
1) You are not even addressing the question you raised here. You are claiming that evil is a philosophical,/i> problem for athgeists, yet you immediately start talking about how you (wrongly) think atheists view the proble of evil for theists. If you want to talk about that, fine (there’s a thread on that over at The Thomas Society right now), but in the current context, it’s a complete red herring.
2) How do you know your moral standards, by which you’re judging God, are any more than social conventions or personal opinions? If that’s all they are, then you’re in no position to make ANY moral judgments, much less put God on trial, for breaking your relative standards. If I’m just a sophisticated animal, who just got here by chance, then moral categories are absurd. How can there be true rights or wrongs?
Utter garbage: of course I am in such a position. What other judgement can any morally autonomous being judge by but their own? What you’re saying here is “If there is no objective morality, how can there be objective morality.” The fact (and it is unavoidable fact) that there is no objective morality does not mean that moral standards are arbitrary, which is the unspoken (because unjustified and unjustifiable) message you are trying to convey. What moral standards we adopt matter because they affect other people. If you need a justification from the command of your imaginary sky-daddy for caring about other people, you’re a psychopath – apparently, many Christians do, and are. Those (including Christians) who are more morally mature recognise that this “argument” is bilge: even if there were a God, it makes perfect sense to ask whether God is good – if you deny that, presumably you’d go around murdering women if you thought God told you to, like Peter Sutcliffe. look up Euthyphro’s dilemma; your argument was disposed of some 2,300+ years ago.
3) why do non-theists believe killing the Amalekites is wrong?
Are you asking a causal or a justificatory question here? If the former, that’s a scientific question, on which considerable progress has been made – and as it happens, one I’ve published a long peer-reviewed paper on. If you want to discuss this, I’m happy to oblige. If the latter, and you really can’t see that the moral judgement that slaughtering thousands of people out of hand is wrong does not need a justification, you are indeed a psychopath. I can’t logically demonstrate from agreed premises to a psychopath that it is wrong – and nor can a theist. Oh, you can tell him your sky-daddy will be very cross and will punish him, but then you’re just appealing to his self-interest.
4) Sure, I might tell people all sorts of comforting lies under the right circumstances. So what? This does not make then one whit more likely to be true, despite your idiotic claim to the contrary. Suppose someone is badly injured, and I tell them they are going to be OK, they are not going to die, even though I don’t believe it. Does that make the claim more likely to be true? Only an idiot would think so.
You stay classy, Knockgoats.
Jonathan can run his blog how he wants to, but around here we keep it respectful and civil, even if you don’t like the arguments. I only suffer ad hominem arguments like yours once.
What a remarkable parade of straw men.
If you want to pose a “problem of evil for atheists” then you should be addressing systems of atheistic ethics, or at the very least the ethical opinions of atheists, rather than starting out with “no god therefore everything is permitted” and then arguing in circles.
Your II should read:
II. The Problem of Evil for non-theists who accept the problem of evil as a valid reason for rejecting that a particular type of god exists
Rusty–I agree with your new heading, but only for the logic portion. I still think the other 3 points are problems for you, regardless of whether you believe this is a valid “defeater” of theism or not.
I look forward to hopefully having time to respond to this.
Talking about this next week and this is quite helpful. Thanks for your thoughts!
What do you tell people on their deathbeds? The woman who just lost a baby? The man just diagnosed with terminal cancer? The lone survivor of a family buried under Haitian rubble? I dare you to give them “there is no after-life, there is no hope, there is no meaning–just make your own out of this.” Only the coldest heart would actually say that, because you know it’s cruel and inhumane.
What you do is listen and you don’t proclaim your own beliefs in contradiction to theirs. Would you tell a dying Hindu about Jesus when she wants to talk about Krishna?
erp–but what if people are unsure, and asking for comfort? What if, in fear and uncertainty, they’re begging for you to give them something to hold on to? What would you say then? This is an honest question. I know what the Christian says, I don’t know what the atheist says. One actually told me, “I would give them the Christian answer.” That’s perhaps more honest.
I’ve noticed everyone is jumping to the proselytizing question, which is something of a red herring here. I’m asking how you console and comfort people. While I realize that’s not a “proof,” I think it raises the dissonance you must feel–that there’s a bankruptcy to your worldview, when it counts most.
“Would you tell a dying Hindu about Jesus…” Since you’ve raised the question, yes, I would. Because I believe this stuff–eternal life, Hell, judgment before God. Because a moment of offense or discomfort is nothing compared to an eternity separated from God. Wouldn’t you think me a monster if I did NOT talk about Jesus in that moment? Like Penn says in the “Gift of a Bible” YouTube clip, if you believe someone’s going to get hit by a bus, how much do you have to hate them to not push them out of the way?
Why do you ask this question as though there’s a one-fits-all formula for comfort? Some people need to be held. Some need to break things. Some people will find comfort in having their beliefs reinforced, and some will accept nothing but the most naked honesty you can muster. If you’re looking for an atheist translation of “Jesus loves you”, you’re not getting the point.
On the contrary, this is one of those things where it’s demonstrably superior to yours. In my moments of weakness, I’ll take empathy and someone who seeks to understand and fill my needs over exploitive proselytizing any day.
The bus is a bad analogy, because only the most tin-headed fundamentalist would insist that their god is as obviously and demonstrably real to a non-believer as a bus. Here’s a more representative scenario: you’re insisting that they’ll be eaten by an invisible dragon that only you know about if they don’t do as you say.
If you like analogies, consider the parallels between your behavior and that of a jackal that wounds his prey and waits for it to be near death and weak from blood loss before coming to finish it off. It’s imperfect as analogies go – your hypothetical behavior here is more that of a scavenger than a predator – but I trust you get my point.
No. I would think you’re a decent human being who respects another’s right to make decisions about their life despite disagreeing with their evaluation of the consequences.
If you did start pushing Jesus at the deathbed of someone who didn’t want it, I would feel fully justified in throwing you out of the room – through the window if necessary.
““Would you tell a dying Hindu about Jesus…” Since you’ve raised the question, yes, I would. Because I believe this stuff–eternal life, Hell, judgment before God. Because a moment of offense or discomfort is nothing compared to an eternity separated from God.”
So the atheist offers immediate comfort knowing that the dying person will shortly be oblivious forever and the Christian offers discomfort thinking otherwise (and many atheists would see this as following from the Christian’s belief, but, they would also see it as unnecessary cruelty). Actually I should say some Christians, I believe most hospital chaplains many of whom are Christian are trained to do the same as the hypothetical atheist, offer what the patient and family/friends see as comfort (their code of ethics prohibits attempts to convert patients or families/friends).
For one thing, the problem of evil has repeatedly become marginalized by atheists and theists alike. They both like to call it the ‘problem of suffering’ in order to think about it in an easier fashion. The problem of evil has two distinct components: transmission of evil and reception of evil. Transmission of evil refers to how God could allow humans to commit evil and distance themselves from God’s presence. This problem is the forerunner to the problem of Hell. Reception of Evil refers to the suffering associated with evil. The reason that I make this point is that often there is a juxtaposition of issues and proofs for the problem of evil. I have heard this one too many times: Why do people suffer? Reply: Because there is free will. There is a relationship between the question and the answer, but the question refers to the reception of evil whereas the answer is referring to the transmission of evil. This may not be relevant to the atheist, but this clarification is essential to the theist that wants to objectively approach this problem.
Interesting distinction Lenny. Is this a Torchian distinction, or one you’ve come across elsewhere?
I believe this is my own, but I gotta give some props to coffee on this one. Coffee, the hallucinogen of Christians.
Steve,
“…it is nevertheless true that in a God-less universe, we are left without a coherent and absolute moral framework.”
How do you establish this? It seems to be the premise doing the most amount of work in your argument but it seems to be glossed over without there being any sort of support for it. There are plenty of ethical systems that seem to be coherent that the atheist can use. It doesn’t seem obvious to me that a kantian system presupposes God, but it seems to be a fine ethical system. There are plenty of others.
Also I don’t see why it would be problematic for the atheist to take your advice:
“If so, you’re assuming the reality of an external, “extra-natural” standard.”
Why not accept moral facts as non-physical/natural entities parts of the world? Why not ground your moral facts in abstract entities like the platonist? Plenty of atheists accept the existence of: numbers, states of affairs, propositions, sets, etc. All of which seem to not be physical/natural entities. But this is still just assuming the physicalist/naturalist is incapable of grounding morality in physical/natural things, like pain and pleasure, or the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of desires, etc.
I don’t see how one can rule out these other options. If they can’t it seems that one could easily be an atheist but not really be bothered by this alleged problem.
So, how does the theist accomplish this task?
Cruz–if you’re not happy with this line of argumentation, I invite you to contribute something constructive. Do you think morality is not a problem at all for the non-theist or do you get there some other way?
Of course the atheist can borrow good moral frameworks from Kant or Plato or whomever, but they are just that, borrowed, and ultimately borrowed from theism. Why does mathematics work? Whence these “abstract entities”? It’s all “Borrowed capital.” The incoherence may not be at the practical ethical level, but in the inability to justify where it comes from and why we ought to heed it.
Atheists are not monolithic, but I am pushing back on the most commonly stated basis for morality that I hear. Many of them espouse to live and believe purely within a naturalistic framework.
I have often heard “I don’t believe in God, because you can’t demonstrate him, you can’t empirically prove him, you can’t test him according to scientific method.” Well, how do you “test” morality? How do you test good and evil? How do you know why something is good or evil?
Here’s the 3 most common sources of morality I hear from atheists:
1. If good & evil is derived from evolutionary mechanisms & biology, why do we reject so much of what we see in the animal kingdom as inhumane, such as killing a rival’s children? It’s only natural, after all. Because we’re more highly evolved and rational? Well then the origin for morality is irrational?
2. If it’s on the basis of cultural norms and social contracts, on what basis can we tell Hutus and Tsutsis that they should stop killing each other? It’s part of their social norms and majority is in favor of it.
If it’s just personal preference, then why should anyone care or listen?
Humane implies specifically human values; it should come as no surprise that non-human animals, with a different evolutionary history, should have different standards of behaviour.
Even our closest relatives, the chimp and bonobo, who are equally close to us (think of them as being siblings while we are a cousin), differ significantly in behaviour, though both share a lot of traits with us.
Remember that evolution is not goal-directed, and contingency plays a huge part; we should no more expect it to converge on a single set of moral values than on a single physical form. Even behaviour that is not in itself adaptive can be selected for as a result of linkage to something else, and even non-adaptive behaviour that isn’t selected for can become fixed via drift.
Actually it is; moral decision-making in practice is almost purely emotional.
Beware of the fallacy of the excluded middle: the negation of “moral absolutism” is not “moral relativism”; there are important intermediate positions. The emotional and evolutionary origins of practical morality imply that there are values which are largely shared by the whole human species; we are justified in judging cultural norms against those values, and even in applying our rationality to try and build or adapt cultures such that their norms are a more optimal match to our values.
You stay classy, Knockgoats.
I leave concerns about tone to those who have weak arguments, but as you say, it’s your blog.
But in a God-less universe, why listen if they are just the result of evolutionary developments, that they are but the way your neurons were conditioned to fire, and have no real meaning? Wouldn’t intellectual honesty mean admitting all this compassion and concern is arbitrary? – Steve
I had missed that you actually claimed that compassion and concern are “arbitrary”. As I said, they are not arbitrary, because they make a difference to other people. “Arbitrary” means it doesn’t matter what choice you make, and clearly it does matter. Also, of course, one could say exactly the same of our selfish impulses as of compassion and concern: they are “arbitrary” to exactly the same extent, so on what grounds would they be privileged over the altruistic ones?
The causal story behind the existence of the compassionate reactions you mention is an interesting one, but has no direct bearing on the justification of morally relevant actions and moral judgments. The fact that we, along with both our selfish and our altruistic impulses, evolved, tells us nothing whatever about how we ought to behave: specifically, we are under no obligation whatever to maximise our inclusive fitness. Taking the interests and preferences of others into account is justified by the fact that doing this benefits others; it requires nothing more.
The “problem of evil” simply is not a philosophical problem for atheists unless they try to hold on to the fiction of an absolute, objective morality while dropping the fiction of a divine source for morality. Apparently those atheists you have argued with over the matter do this, or at least, you think they do. Kant’s “categorical imperative” is the best attempt to ground an objective morality, but still leads to absurd consequences, like the absolute prohibition on lying.
Knockgoats–this is a tone I can live with.
I am talking about compassion & concern as arbitrary in terms of cause, not consequence. Of course they have consequence, that’s my point. “Clearly it does matter”–but why? If I’m just a sophisticated animal, then why choose to let a potential rival’s offspring live instead of die?
“Taking the interests and preferences of others into account is justified by the fact that doing this benefits others.” But what about when people’s interests compete or conflict? On what basis do you resolve that? Whose interests and preferences should be privileged?
Steve,
“Cruz–if you’re not happy with this line of argumentation, I invite you to contribute something constructive. Do you think morality is not a problem at all for the non-theist or do you get there some other way?”
I don’t think that morality is a problem any more for non-theists than it is for theists. It is unclear that God can provide the sort of base or explanation for morality that you want Him to be able to.
I am inclined to think that morality is not a problem for either party.
There are some other moral arguments for God’s existence that are different from the one that you gave. Here is a link to one:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god/#SecProEvi
I have not had time to sufficiently consider these, but at first glance they all seem to presuppose that morality includes things that I am not sure that it does, or that the atheist would even find plausible.
“Of course the atheist can borrow good moral frameworks from Kant or Plato or whomever, but they are just that, borrowed, and ultimately borrowed from theism. ”
I’m not saying that the framework was borrowed from Plato, I’m saying platonic entities can provide a foundation for morality. Certain abstracta can do the job of grounding moral truths.
But a further question is: Even if they are borrowed from a theistic framework is this even problematic for the atheist? Imagine that all moral systems are ultimately derived from systems that come out of a theistic picture. Is this a problem for the atheist? Well it depends on whether or not the moral framework can be made conceptually distinct from theism. I do not see how something like Kant’s categorical imperative is not conceptually distinct from theism. It may appear first in a theistic picture, but this does not tell us anything about the conceptual connections.
“Why does mathematics work? Whence these “abstract entities”? It’s all “Borrowed capital.” The incoherence may not be at the practical ethical level, but in the inability to justify where it comes from and why we ought to heed it.”
A question is: Why should the atheist think that we should be able to answer these questions or that there are answers to these question? I think it is perfectly satisfying to think that because there just is not any other way in which mathematics could work, there is no need to give it an explanation. Maybe they work in virtue of the way in which the abstracta are related. As for wondering where abstracta came from, there are questions about whether or not this question is coherent and plenty of reasons to think its not, I personally think one can ask about what grounds them but it is still not totally unsatisfying to answer ‘nothing’. (What grounds God’s existence? Where did He come from? ‘Nothing’. ‘Nowhere’.)
It is not clear that the theist can really ground morality in God. How does she expect to do this? Is it grounded in His eternal decrees/commands? It then seems arbitrary, but morality is not arbitrary. What else could the theist ground it in? And how can it be done in such a way that it is non-trivial to say ‘God is good’ but rich and meaningful.
“Atheists are not monolithic, but I am pushing back on the most commonly stated basis for morality that I hear. Many of them espouse to live and believe purely within a naturalistic framework.”
That’s fine. I am inclined to agree with you that a good ethics would entail facts that are grounded in non-natural or non-physical entities. But then maybe the argument should be posed as a problem for naturalists and physicalists instead of atheists as a whole.
Still, there are plausible systems of ethics that the naturalist can take on. Some are more and less attractive. We could be egoists, or hedonists, or utilitarians, etc., and still be naturalists.
Steve. I am a Christian. I do think God grounds the moral truths about this world, and that everything that is distinct from him depends on him. But I don’t think that this argument can establish that conclusion, nor do I think any argument that does not already use premises that include some unique theistic truth about God and the rest of the world can establish this conclusion either. I don’t think that we can show that an atheist is conceptually required to be a relativist or a subjectivist.
I am talking about compassion & concern as arbitrary in terms of cause, not consequence.
In what sense is something that has emerged from the interaction of evolutionary, cultural and personal history “arbitrary”? Why are compassion and concern any more “arbitrary” than selfishness? I also suspect you are not distinguishing between cause and justification. The causal story behind my deciding to take the interests and preferences of others into account is complex, and has to do with my genetic/evolutionary and cultural inheritances, and personal experiences. The justification for doing so is simply that others will be better off if I do. Why is that so hard for you to grasp?
Of course they have consequence, that’s my point. “Clearly it does matter”–but why? If I’m just a sophisticated animal, then why choose to let a potential rival’s offspring live instead of die?
What sort of a “why” is this? Are you asking for an answer in terms of motivation? If so, the answer would be “Because I felt compassion for them.” If you want the causal story that accounts for me feeling compassion, that concerns neurophysiology and the more remote causal factors mentioned above. If you want a justification, then it’s because their offspring want to stay alive. (I note parenthetically that a “potential rival” is in general also a “potential helper”, which is part of the causal story, but not part of the justification.) I think you are under the misapprehension that natural selection “tells” us to act ruthlessly, or would justify us doing so in the absence of a God. Wrong; absolutely wrong. It is simply a natural process, as devoid of motivation and as irrelevant to justifying a moral judgement or decision as gravity.
“Taking the interests and preferences of others into account is justified by the fact that doing this benefits others.” But what about when people’s interests compete or conflict? On what basis do you resolve that? Whose interests and preferences should be privileged?
In general, this is of course a complex and difficult practical and moral problem – but how is it relevant to your claim that evil poses a philosophical problem for atheists? If I’m faced with a moral dilemma, I think about the likely consequences of possible courses of action, and in some cases of the likely consequences of adopting certain general rules of conduct, in order to decide what I ought to do (there is no general algorithm that can give me – or anyone – the answer in all cases). I don’t need to pretend that there is some fundamental feature of reality – divine or otherwise – that justifies my decision; instead, I take responsibility for it myself.
Here’s the 3 most common sources of morality I hear from atheists[...]
It isn’t either/or, it is a complex system. Say that all your morality comes from God is the easy way out of this issue.
What definition?
The normal definitions of “creator” and “creation” absolutely do not entail any conclusions regarding mutual comprehensibility.
It’s certainly true that until relatively recent times such a conclusion would have been considered “obvious”, but it doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. The assumption that complex effects must have complex causes fell apart with the study of concepts such as fractals, automata, self-organizing behaviour, and so on.
Hey Steve,
I. The Problem of Evil for Christians
Allow me to try to clarify what argument I think Dan was making at Sojourn. If we assume that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good, then evil cannot exist. When people claim that this is logically true, they are also making a few additional, usually unspoken, assumptions. Let me pose the argument a different way.
1. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
2. God created the world and everything in it.
3. Nothing in the world would exist if not for God.
4. Evil exists.
5. Evil would not exist if not for God.
6. If Y exists because of X, and would not exist if not for X, then X is in some sense responsible for Y.
7. God is therefore in some sense responsible for the existence of evil.
8. A perfectly “good” being is not responsible for (i.e., doesn’t do) evil.
9. Contradiction. Therefore, such a God does not exist.
Here’s another argument:
1. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
2. It is itself evil to allow evil to exist if the ability to prevent such evil also exists.
3. God does evil by allowing evil to exist.
4. If a being does evil, they are not perfectly good.
5. Contradiction. Therefore such a God does not exist.
If the assumptions are made, then the arguments logically follow. Of course, you can always avoid the conclusion by denying one or more of the assumptions.
II. The Problem of Evil for non-theists
1. Logically:
I think your assertion of the “implicit logic” of non-theists is sloppy and not really as common as you might think it is. I’m pretty sure that almost all people who accept the “problem of evil” as a reason to reject the existence of God are accepting something much more along the lines of the two arguments I gave above. I suppose I could be wrong though. I will agree with you though that “if God exists, everything he does would make sense to me” isn’t necessarily true. However, I think you’re almost sort of putting up a straw man here, attacking an argument that isn’t really being made, or at least isn’t being made to the extent that one would think after reading your post.
Also, I just want to point out that your last sentence “the assumption that if something in the universe doesn’t make sense to me, therefore God doesn’t exist, is inherently fallacious” is ironic because the much more frequent claim is “something in the universe doesn’t make sense to me, therefore God DOES exist”.
2&3. Epistemologically and Ethically/Morally:
I combined these because I think they are really the same argument. I will try to explain ethics to you again, Steve, in more detail this time. Hopefully if you read through it carefully, you will at least get something out of it.
It is important to understand the distinction between descriptive and normative. ‘Descriptive’ pertains to truth claims, claims about reality. ‘Normative’ pertains to standards, not to things which are explicitly ‘true’ or ‘false’. In ethics, the distinction is between “descriptive ethics” and “normative ethics”.
Descriptive ethics is a matter for science, not philosophy. It asks questions like: “What values does a particular culture have?” “What opinions did various societies have about action or practice X?” “What do the majority of a certain people view to be right or wrong?” “Why do we believe what we believe about ethics/morality?”
When you ask where morality comes from, or what the source of morality is, some people give you descriptive answers, answering why people believe that some things are right or wrong, giving an account of the biological and evolutionary causes of our beliefs and behaviors, rather than addressing what I think you’re asking for, which is an account of normative ethics.
Normative ethics is more philosophical in nature. It asks what things ARE right or wrong, rather than simply asking what people BELIEVE to be right or wrong. The descriptive/normative divide sort of parallels the is/ought divide. Questions of what ‘should’ be done or of what actions ‘ought’ to be taken or are ‘right’ are questions which cannot be answered unless normative standards are presupposed. Those normative standards give meaning to words like ‘should’ and ‘ought’ and ‘right’. For example, if we presuppose utilitarianism (i.e., if we define words like ‘should’, ‘ought’, and ‘right’ in terms of utilitarianism), then we have a clear meaning for questions like “What should I do?”. ‘Should’ is meaningless unless a goal is presupposed. ‘Should’ is what you need to do as a means to accomplishing some goal. In this case, the goal is to conform to a particular standard.
But what is the correct standard? And how do we know? I know these are the questions you want to ask. And the fact that you want to ask them shows that you don’t completely grasp normativity. The questions you ask cannot be answered unless you define ‘correct’. In other words, you need to presuppose a standard of correctness (i.e., what constitutes something being ‘correct’) if you really want to judge normative standards themselves as such. What standards we ultimately presuppose will depend upon what our goals are.
Normativity doesn’t just pertain to ethics. Traffic laws are normative. The rules of a card game are normative. What word refers to a particular concept is normative. These standards are not arbitrary. In some cases, there may be some amount of arbitrariness. But generally speaking, we have reasons for choosing the standards that we do. That you choose to call the thing that heats our planet “the sun”, while not explicitly clear why it “should” be called “the sun”, you have good reason for calling it such, as doing so serves as a means to your goals of things like convenience.
When you ask how I know what ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are, my response still comes down to the fact that you are unable to adequately define such terms. I can’t answer you if I don’t know what you’re asking. This isn’t just me trying to be difficult. This is me pointing out the fact that questions have to be clear and meaningful in order to lead to a clear and meaningful answer.
For an explanation of why I think utilitarianism is the ‘best’ ethical philosophy, see my Facebook note. I would also again recommend reading chapters 1 and 12 of Practical Ethics, “About Ethics” and “Why Act Morally?”.
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10803045517
Whether or not God exists changes none of this. I understand that you views about ethics/morality are common in Christianity. I’ve heard them numerous times before. But I really feel like this is one of the least persuasive areas of Christian apologetics.
The idea that if God does not exist, everything is permitted, is only true after we presuppose a standard of ethics which states that “something is only forbidden if God forbids it”. For those who do not presuppose such a standard, it does not follow that everything is permitted if God does not exist. (By the way, saying that “everything is permitted” is saying that “everything is ethically permitted”, which is kind of presupposing a standard of ethics. So people who say that everything is permitted if God does not exist are in a way saying that even if God doesn’t exist, there is still a standard of ethics which permits us to take certain actions.)
4. Experientially/Emotionally:
We have evolved to care about others. We have also evolved to use reason, and to want to live consistently. The fact that we have evolved to have certain feelings and emotions and values doesn’t imply that we should want to “rationally overcome” them, whatever that means.
As for people on their death beds, I will say what I have said before, which is that I would try to comfort them. This will obviously mean different things for different people. But this has absolutely nothing to do with any of your problems of evil. I personally am not depressed by the fact that life is finite. Not everyone on their death bed needs a false hope in order to feel better about death. For many, death is a gift, a peaceful end to a painful experience. Death is only a bad thing to the extent that we no longer experience the good things in life. And it’s only a good thing to the extent that we no longer experience the bad things in life. So I look at death as in some sense really quite neutral in terms of value.
Let me close by saying that the “problem of evil” as it is traditionally and popularly known, is only a problem for those who assume the premises I stated in my arguments near the beginning of this comment but reject the conclusion. It is not a problem for atheists. You are using “problem of evil” instead as a sort of catch phrase for all problems related to concepts of evil. While there is nothing necessarily wrong with this, it is very misleading and confusing to say that the “problem of evil” is more of a problem for atheists, when clearly you do not mean what most people will no doubt think you mean.
rustophilus,
“6. If Y exists because of X, and would not exist if not for X, then X is in some sense responsible for Y.
7. God is therefore in some sense responsible for the existence of evil.
8. A perfectly “good” being is not responsible for (i.e., doesn’t do) evil.”
I just want to touch on this real quick, so sorry for the lack of depth in this comment.
It seems there are two interpretations one can make to this premise, but one although valid yields one of 6-8 false, and the other makes all of the premises true but yields an invalid argument. At first glance it looks like you are equivocating, so it seems like the later.
Sorry again for the brevity, but I got to run.
Just to note that my distinction between the “cause” and “justification” of moral judgements is as far as I can tell the same as rustophilus’ distinction between “descriptive” and “normative” ethics.
Steve,
While I realize that’s not a “proof,” I think it raises the dissonance you must feel–that there’s a bankruptcy to your worldview, when it counts most.
By “bankruptcy”, I take it you mean “doesn’t tell you everything’s going to be OK”. No, it doesn’t. In your worldview, most dying people, not being Christians, are about to be “eternally separated from God”, which you think a terrible fate (and presumably, think they will think a terrible fate once it has happened). Very comforting.
“Would you tell a dying Hindu about Jesus…” Since you’ve raised the question, yes, I would. Because I believe this stuff–eternal life, Hell, judgment before God. Because a moment of offense or discomfort is nothing compared to an eternity separated from God. Wouldn’t you think me a monster if I did NOT talk about Jesus in that moment?
No, I would think you properly respectful of their personal autonomy. That you would proselytise at such a time confirms my view that religion, and Christianity in particular, leads people to do evil things with good intentions.
I just finished reading over all of the comments thus far.
Steve—As for your #4, some good points have been made by the commenters. If the goal is to provide comfort, then the atheist is in fact in a better position to comfort the dying individual than the Christian. I agree 100% with erp, when he said, “What you do is listen and you don’t proclaim your own beliefs in contradiction to theirs.” An atheist can tell the truth, or lie if need be – whatever provides the most comfort – because for us there is no further consideration for that individual beyond what little time they have left.
In saying that you would tell a Hindu about Jesus, (assuming your theological beliefs are correct) you are absolutely right to do so, and you absolutely would be a monster not to. But if comfort is the goal, then trying to convert a Hindu to Christianity is not your best option.
I remain completely stumped as to what point you’re trying to make in #4. When you say “I think it raises the dissonance you must feel—that there is a bankruptcy to your worldview, when it counts most”, I really don’t know what you’re talking about. To me, it just sounds like you’re saying, “It would be better if Christianity were true. Therefore, Christianity is probably true.” That’s how I think most people are reading your argument. So if that’s not your intent, then you may want to clarify.
This post is apropos:
http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2010/03/secularism_does_not_find_valid.php
Moral systems are borrowed – who’s to say? Did no moral system exist before the Christian one? Did Christian morality not borrow from a previous set of beliefs? I borrow from the Christian system of morals simply because that is what our society basically operates on, yet that doesn’t mean that I’ll “borrow” Leviticus 18:22. All religion creates community and contributes to the operation of civilization and society, yet claiming that because atheists participate in society and therefore in a system of morality doesn’t mean much in regard to Christianity, because morality conceivably existed before religion did.
This debate is going on all over the internet:
http://impartialism.blogspot.com/2010/02/atheist-argument-from-morality.html